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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

CLASH OF THE INTEGRATIONISTS: THE MISMATCH OF CIVIL
RIGHTS IMPERATIVES IN SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES

HENRY KORMAN*
A northeastern state embarked on an ambitious planning effort to develop
supportive housing opportunities for homeless people with serious mental
illnesses in subsidized, scattered site, community-based apartments as an
alternative to hospitalization and placement in halfway houses. The initiative
brought together state mental health officials, state housing agencies, nonprofit developers, homeless service providers, and civil rights advocates. The
plan that emerged from the group would have combined state and federal
housing funds to build housing for homeless people with mental illnesses,
where services would be available on a voluntary basis to individual
participants. The effort stalled and then stopped altogether when the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development enforced a rule that prohibits
use of federal housing funds in developments that serve people with a single
type of diagnosis.

I. INTRODUCTION
There exists a tension within the idea of disability rights. It coalesces
around the questions of whether, when, and how an individual’s characteristics
as a person with disabilities should be factors in access to employment,
housing, and public services. There is a day-to-day reality to these questions in
any number of contexts. This article focuses on one: equal access to integrated
housing opportunities for people with significant disabilities, including
homeless people with disabilities, who choose to receive supportive services in
community-based settings. In that context, there is a failure of two systems to
function together. Supportive services are generally delivered through systems
that make services available to people with disabilities based on their category
of disability. Mainstream federal housing programs permit admissions and
selection preferences under a broad, all-inclusive definition of disability, but
* Henry Korman is a sole practitioner from Boston, MA, specializing in affordable housing
development and civil rights. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of the following
friends and colleagues whose contributions of time and insight improved this article in countless
ways: Michael Allen, Nestor Davidson, Steven Day, Robert Fleischner, Ann O’Hara, Daniel
Rosen and Roberta Rubin.
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they tend to prohibit programs that serve categories of people with disabilities.
The clash in these two approaches often thwarts attempts to create integrated,
community-based housing opportunities for meeting the needs of people with
disabilities.
Advances in disability rights over the last four decades mark a far-reaching
“paradigm shift” in how and where people with disabilities receive housing
and supportive services. 1 Old models hid people with mental illnesses, people
with physical disabilities, and people with mental retardation and other
developmental disabilities in state psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes, state
schools, and intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR).
These places were often squalid, and by definition they were segregated and
isolated from community life. The delivery of services in such settings was
controlled by single purpose agencies with the narrow mission of serving
people with a single type of disability.
Beginning in the 1970s, civil rights lawsuits improved living conditions,
and in some cases succeeded in closing the worst of these places. When
institutional care was replaced, it was with a “continuum of facilities” 2
including community residences, halfway houses, and other community-based
facilities often characterized “as ‘mini-institutions,’ ‘candy-coated hospitals,’
and ‘living room jails.’” 3 The continuum includes homeless shelters and
transitional housing for homeless people who “tend to have disabling health
and behavioral health problems.” 4 In the continuum model, housing and
services are “bundled” and delivered in a range of settings from most
restrictive to least restrictive based on the extent and nature of an individual’s
disability. “To move from a more restrictive setting to a less restrictive

1. Michael Allen, Waking Rip Van Winkle: Why Developments in the Last Twenty Years
Should Teach the Mental Health System Not to Use Housing as a Tool of Coercion, 21 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 503, 504, 521 (2003); Paul J. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental
Illness: Emerging Approaches to Research and Practice, 44 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
439, 442 (1993) [hereinafter Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness].
2. ANN O’HARA & STEVEN DAY, CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC.,
OLMSTEAD AND SUPPORTIVE HOUSING: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 7 (2001), available at
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/supportive_housing.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
3. John V. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation and Mental Disability, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
1231, 1252 (2003) (citations omitted).
4. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: ENDING
CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS FOR PERSONS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS AND/OR COOCCURRING SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS 3 (2003), available at http://download.ncadi.
samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/SMA04-3870/SMA04-3870.pdf [hereinafter HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR
CHANGE]; see also Ronnie Michelle Greenwood et al., Decreasing Psychiatric Symptoms by
Increasing Choice in Services for Adults with Histories of Homelessness, 36 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOGY 223, 224 (2005) (describing “Continuum of Care” in provision of homeless
services funded by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).
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setting. . .an individual must acquire more independent living skills and need
fewer services.” 5 Like large institutions, continuum-type facilities persist.
And like those large institutions, housing and services are typically delivered
through single purpose agencies and non-profit organizations that serve limited
categories of people with disabilities.
In the slow evolution of the new paradigm over the last decade, the most
recent model for provision of housing and services is “permanent supportive
housing.” There is no single definition of supportive housing. Indeed, some of
the statutory housing programs that fund supportive housing define it to
include continuum-type facilities. 6 For purposes of this discussion, the
concept of supportive housing is used more precisely to describe an advance
over institutional and quasi-institutional settings. “Common principles of
supportive housing include” settings where housing is permanent, and not
transitional. 7 Housing “must be ‘unbundled’ from supportive services and not
made contingent on receipt of services. However, supportive services must be
made available. . .if needed and desired. Supportive services must be flexible
and individualized, rather than defined by a ‘program.’” 8 Even with these
shared principles, the “lack of a common definition . . . typifies segmented
approaches that evolved as supported housing was developed for disparate
groups.” 9 In other words, supportive housing tends to serve categories of
people with disabilities, just like institutions and continuum facilities.
The supportive housing model places a high premium on permanent
housing. It recognizes that many people with disabilities are extremely poor. 10
Consequently, it is reliant on mainstream federal housing programs “to expand
affordable housing opportunities for low-income people or people with

5. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2; see also Greenwood et al., supra note 4.
6. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8013(k)(1), (4) (2006) (Section 811 program of supportive
housing for people with disabilities may include group homes and independent living facilities);
42 U.S.C. § 11384 (2006) (Supportive Housing Program for homeless people may include
transitional housing, permanent housing, housing that meets the immediate or long term needs of
homeless people, and single room occupancy housing); 42 U.S.C. § 12703(5) (2006) (supportive
housing constructed with funds from HOME Investment Partnership program “combines
structural features and services needed to enable persons with special needs to live with dignity
and independence”); 71 Fed. Reg. 38882, 38883 (Jul. 10, 2006) (for purpose of disposition of
surplus federal housing to assist homeless people, “permanent supportive housing means longterm, affordable, community-based housing that is linked to appropriate supportive health and
social services . . . that enable homeless individuals and homeless families with disabilities to
maintain housing”).
7. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 8.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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disabilities, including those who are homeless.” 11 It is at this place where
housing programs and supportive services programs intersect that there is a
conflict within the new paradigm.
The source of this conflict is in a clash of integrationist ideals. State and
federal providers of supportive services are motivated by the command of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Olmstead v. L.C. 12 States must maintain “a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for” assuring that people with disabilities are offered the
opportunity to live outside of institutions in the most appropriate “integrated
setting” by means of “a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not
controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated . . . .” 13 Because Olmstead requires the deinstitutionalization of
people isolated by diagnosis in places administered by agencies identified by
diagnosis, its implementation is by necessity focused on category of disability.
Restrictions in housing programs that prohibit preferences based on category
of disability are also integrationist. Those limitations place a premium on
equal treatment and equality of opportunity, and interpret preferences based on
diagnosis as a form of exclusion and segregation. In the housing context, the
integrationist ideal is one in which protected characteristics should not be a
factor in the distribution of benefits and equality of opportunity is a function of
choice in a market that ought to disregard disability.
Experience teaches that this clash of integrationist ideals can sometimes
interfere with efforts to develop supportive housing for people with disabilities.
Use of Project-Based Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers to create supportive
housing is the most recent example of such problems. Until rule changes were
published in 2005, the Project-Based Voucher program was subject to general
provisions that forbade any form of preferential admission based on category
of disability. 14 Regulatory waivers by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) were necessary to construct Project-Based
Voucher housing targeted at individuals receiving supportive services on a
categorical basis. The process was lengthy, the outcome uncertain. The
consequent delays and denials added significantly to project cost and
undermined project feasibility. 15

11. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 52; see also O’HARA & DAY, supra
note 2, at 10 (“people with significant disabilities- like other extremely low income groupsshould have more access to government housing programs to make housing truly affordable. . .”).
12. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
13. Id. at 584, 585.
14. 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(b)(1) (2005) made applicable to Project Based Vouchers by 24
C.F.R. § 983.1(b)(1) (2005).
15. CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
COLLABORATIVE, OPENING DOORS, THE SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER PROGRAM:
CREATING NEW HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 8 (2006). For
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The conflict in civil rights principles raises several questions: What is it
about the status of people with disabilities that makes supportive housing such
a crucial resource? Why is it that category of disability is so central to the
delivery of supportive services? What characteristics of housing programs
cause the mismatch in principles? What civil rights considerations motivate
the apparently different conceptions of the integrationist ideal? Is it possible to
close the gap in thinking in order to promote access to housing opportunity for
people with disabilities in a manner that honors an integrationist ideal? Is there
evidence of a “newer paradigm” of supportive housing that suggests a trend
towards the ideal?
The answers to these questions lie in a better understanding of the
overarching civil rights principles that are common to systems of supportive
services and affordable housing programs. The concept of supportive housing
originated among people with disabilities, clinicians, and civil rights advocates
concerned with individual dignity, personal choice, and autonomy. A true
supportive housing model honors these themes. From this vantage, the
apparent integrationist contradiction between programs that provide services
and programs that provide housing is a false conflict. If in practical design and
implementation, supportive housing programs adhere to principles of
integration, it should not matter if the programs serve all people with
disabilities or just some targeted group based on category of disability.
II. THE STATUS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND THE NEED FOR
SUPPORTIVE SERVICES AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING
The most important factor affecting the status of people with disabilities is
disability itself. Although it is often expressed in medical or functional terms,
“disability” is a social construct and therefore is assigned different meanings in
different contexts. 16 The 2000 United States Census uses a variety of
definitions of disability, including sensory disability, physical disability,
mental disability, self-care disability, “going-outside-the-home disability,” and
employment disability. 17 The ADA and other civil rights laws protecting
people with disabilities like the Fair Housing Act (also known as Title VIII)
examples of approved waivers see 69 Fed. Reg. 47249, 47279 to 47283 (Aug. 4, 2004) (selection
preferences for people with chronic persistent mental illness, people with developmental
disabilities, and people with AIDS); 69 Fed. Reg. 62992, 63010 (Oct. 28, 2004) (homeless people
with significant disabilities that interfere with their ability to find and maintain housing, including
people with chronic persistent mental illness); 69 Fed. Reg. 64440, 64445 (Nov. 4, 2004); and 70
Fed. Reg. 2218, 2240 (Jan. 12, 2005) (people with HIV/AIDS).
16. Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination,
200 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 895 (2000).
17. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN
FAMILIES: 2000 2 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN
FAMILIES].
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and Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) define
“disability” to include people with medical conditions that impair activities of
daily living, people with a history of impairments who are not currently people
with disabilities, and individuals perceived by others to be people with
disabilities. 18 Laws that distribute public benefits based on disability, like
supportive services and housing, typically define the qualifying features of
disability only by the existence of a serious or significant impairment. 19 The
range of definitions is a reflection of the social goal of the program. 20
Any civil rights discussion about disability must recognize that disability is
an individual experience. There are hundreds of conditions that affect different
people in vastly different ways. The people protected by the outcome of
Olmstead are people in institutions or at risk of institutionalization. 21
Supportive housing generally is targeted at people with serious and persistent

18. The ADA, Title VIII and Section 504 definitions of “disability” are virtually identical.
For the ADA’s definition see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(h) (2006). The Section 504 definition of
disability is in 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B), § 794(a) (2006). The Title VIII definition of disability is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2006). Title VIII actually uses the term “handicap person” to
describe the class of people with disabilities protected by fair housing laws. Id. The terminology
used here follows the ADA convention, recognizing that many people with disabilities find the
term “handicap” objectionable because, like racial slurs, it is a word “overlaid with stereotypes,
patronizing attitudes and other emotional connotations.” 56 Fed. Reg. 35693, 35698 (Jul. 26,
1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36).
19. For example, an individual qualifies as a person with disabilities for federally funded
medical assistance (Medicaid) and needs-based Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash
disability benefits if he or she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted. . .for a continuous period of. . .twelve months. . .” 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A) (2006) (SSI benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(v) (2006) (Medicaid available to
persons with disabilities within the meaning of the SSI statute). Federal housing programs
generally rely on a definition of disability under which a person qualifies if the individual has a
disability meeting Social Security disability standards, has developmental disabilities, or has “a
physical, mental or emotional impairment which (I) is expected to be of long-continued and
indefinite duration, (II) substantially impedes his or her ability to live independently, and (III) is
of such a nature that such ability could be improved by more suitable housing conditions.” 42
U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(3)(E) (2006). Programs targeted at people experiencing chronic homelessness
serve people “with a disabling condition,” defined as “a diagnosable substance abuse disorder,
serious mental illness, developmental disability, or chronic physical illness or disability, including
the co-occurrence of two or more of these conditions.” 24 C.F.R. § 91.5 (2006). For a more
complete discussion of the variety of definitions at work in different social benefits programs see
Robert Silverstein, Emerging Disability Policy Framework: A Guidepost for Analyzing Public
Policy, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1715 (2000).
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999) (plaintiffs are people confined to
psychiatric units); Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-1034 (D. Haw.
1999) (“most integrated setting” mandate of ADA protects people living at home at risk of
institutionalization).
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disabilities who desire support with activities of daily living, or need assistance
in order to overcome barriers to getting into and staying in housing.
Not all people with disabilities need or want to live in supportive settings.
It is therefore important to bear in mind that the individuals who desire or
qualify for supportive housing represent a subset of all people with disabilities.
Those individuals who do desire supportive housing include frail elders,
chronically homeless people, and people with significant disabilities. These
are people with “specific functional limitations and long-term difficulty with
functional or daily living activities.” 22 They are often individuals who need
“long-term supports and services in order to live as independently as
possible.” 23 People with significant physical disabilities require the removal of
architectural barriers, and they may need assistive technology and adaptive
equipment. 24 More than seven million people need personal care assistance
with activities of daily living such as eating, getting in and out of bed or a
chair, bathing, dressing or toileting. 25 Some people with serious mental
illnesses need periodic assistance with money management, medication
management, vocational support and skills training, socialization, housing
search, and crisis support, especially to prevent re-hospitalization. 26 People
with developmental disabilities such as mental retardation may require similar
22. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 17, at 3. “The
term ‘functional limitations’ generally refers to people who have difficulty performing one of
more functional activities, such as seeing, hearing, speaking, lifting, using stairs, or walking.” Id.
at 3 n.6.
23. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 7.
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME
AND COMMUNITY SERVICES: A PRIMER 56 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/
reports/primer.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (“individuals with physical impairments benefit
from home and vehicle modifications”) [hereinafter HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME
AND COMMUNITY SERVICES]; see also STEVEN LUTZKY, LISA MARIA B. ALECIH, JENNIFER
DUFFY & CHRISTINA NEILL, THE LEWIN GROUP, REVIEW OF THE MEDICAID 1915(C) HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM LITERATURE AND PROGRAM DATA: FINAL
REPORT 15-16 (2000), available at http://www.lewin.com/Lewin_Publications/Medicaid_and_SCHIP/Publication-4.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (describing assistive technology and adaptive
equipment).
25. Jae Kennedy & Mitchell P. LaPlante, Disabilities Statistics Rehabilitation Research and
Training Center, Institute for Health & Aging, in A PROFILE OF ADULTS NEEDING ASSISTANCE
WITH ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING, 1991-1992 5 (1997); see also Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to
Personal Assistance Services: “Most Integrated Setting Appropriate” Requirements and the
Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 17 (2001) (“Sixteen percent
of people over age sixty-five require assistance with their activities of daily living . . . [a]mong
the working-age population (ages 18-64), the personal assistance rate rose by 35% during the
1980s to 2.7 % in 1993”) (citations omitted).
26. Jessica Jonikas & Judith Cook, Research in Psychosocial Rehabilitation, in BEST
PRACTICES IN PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION 63-64 (Ruth Hughes and Diane Weinstein, eds.,
International Association of Psychosocial Rehabilitation Services 2000); Carling, supra note 1, at
443-444.
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services, and may also benefit from case management and habilitation services
that are “designed to assist individuals in acquiring, retaining and improving
the self-help, socialization, and adaptive skills necessary to reside successfully
in home and community based settings . . . .” 27
People with disabilities are also significantly and disproportionately poor
compared to their counterparts without disabilities. Of the 49.7 million
individuals with disabilities in the United States, 8.7 million live in poverty. 28
That poverty rate of 17.6 % is two-thirds higher than the poverty rate for
people without disabilities, 10.6 %. 29 While nearly eighty percent of
individuals age sixteen to sixty-four are working, only sixty percent of working
age people with disabilities are employed. 30 The poverty rate for individuals
with disabilities of working age is double that of people without
disabilities. 31Sixty-one percent of families with a household member with
disabilities receive Social Security benefits, needs-based Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), or public assistance, compared to 17.8 % of families
where there is no person with a disability. 32 The median income of families
reporting full time earnings where the family includes a member with
disabilities is nearly sixteen percent less than other families. 33
Housing resources that serve all low-income people are scarce, and that
scarcity is particularly burdensome for people with disabilities. 34 Each year
HUD prepares a congressional report estimating the number of U.S.
households with “worst case housing needs.” 35 These families are renter

27. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24.
28. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEFS, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000 2, tbl.1
(numbers of people with disabilities), 10 (employment and poverty) (2003).
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2, tbl.1, 10.
32. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 17, at 6.
33. Id. at 8. Data on families excludes households that include people “who only reported
difficulty in working;” that is, people who report only a work disability. Id. at 3. For the
conditions of poverty faced by chronically homeless people see HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE,
supra note 4, at 23.
34. See HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, AFFORDABLE HOUSING
NEEDS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE SIGNIFICANT NEED FOR HOUSING 41 (2005)
[hereinafter HUD, AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS] (“There are only 78.2 affordable units for
every 100 extremely-low-income households. The ratio of available units is about half as great,
at 44 units per 100 households, and even among these available units, only three-fourths are
physically adequate.”). For purposes of the report, “affordable” units include subsidized and
other assisted housing, and unassisted units in the private market priced at affordable levels. Id.
at 40. The lesser availability of affordable units results from the fact that many affordable units
are occupied by households with higher incomes. See HUD, TRENDS IN WORST CASE NEEDS
FOR HOUSING, 1978-1999: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 52
(2003).
35. See HUD, AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 34.
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households without rental assistance or other housing subsidies, “very low
incomes (below 50% of area median income- AMI) who pay more than half of
their income for housing or live in severely substandard housing” or both.36
HUD measures the rate of worst case housing need among very low-income
people with disabilities at 36.4%. 37 The agency acknowledges that the annual
worst case needs study significantly undercounts both the total number of very
low-income renter households with disabilities, and the number of those
disabled families with worst case housing needs. 38 Even with the low
estimates, the rate of need among disabled households is higher than any other
group whose needs are measured by the report, including families with
children and elderly families. 39 When a group of disability rights advocates
examined HUD data in 1996, they identified 1.7 million non-elderly
households including people with disabilities with worst case needs, a number
ten times the amount identified by HUD for the same time period. 40
For the 4.1 million people with disabilities who rely on needs-based SSI
payments, the measure of housing need is particularly troubling. 41 In twenty
states, the fair market rent standard used by HUD to measure the cost of a
modest one bedroom apartment for purposes of the Section 8 Housing Choice
Voucher program exceeds the entire amount of an individual monthly SSI
payment. 42 There is no state in the nation where the fair market rent is less
than seventy one percent of monthly SSI benefits. 43

36. Id. at 1.
37. Id. at 20.
38. Id. at 78-79.
39. Id. at 20. The worst case rate among elderly families is 34.5% and among families with
children it is 29%. Id. at 19.
40. CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
COLLABORATIVE, OPENING DOORS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FEDERAL POLICY TO ADDRESS
THE HOUSING NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 11 (1996). Other government studies
suggest that HUD seriously underestimates the numbers of very low-income non-elders with
disabilities and consequently, the number of families including people with disabilities with worst
case housing needs. Compare GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: IMPACT OF
DESIGNATED PUBLIC HOUSING ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 35, app. I, tbl.I.1 (1998) (2.1
million very low-income renter households including a person with disabilities), with HUD,
AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 34, at 27 (“1.4 million very-low-income renter
households have members with disabilities”).
41. CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES HOUSING TASK FORCE AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE COLLABORATIVE, PRICED OUT IN 2004: THE HOUSING CRISIS FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES (2005).
42. Id.
43. Id. The HUD fair market rent, or FMR, is generally represented by the fortieth
percentile rent based on “housing market-wide estimates of rents that provide opportunities to
rent standard quality housing.” 24 C.F.R. § 888.113(a) (2006). Thus, it is a rent level that is
lower than even the median rent for a particular market area.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

12

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

The confluence of poverty, high rent burdens, poor housing conditions, the
decrease in the numbers of people living in institutions, and the need for
supports that foster independent living lead to an unavoidable result. To
accomplish the goal of integration that is the mandate of Olmstead, many
people with disabilities require “publicly funded social programs which are
necessary to enable transition from the segregated world of institutions and to
facilitate full participation in civil life.” 44
III. SUPPORTIVE SERVICES AND THE IMPERATIVE TO DEINSTITUTIONALIZE
“Most people who require long-term care services receive their personal
care under the ‘informal support model,’ in which uncompensated services are
provided by family members and friends.” 45 However, it is also true that after
out-of-pocket personal expenditures, the largest source of funds for long-term
care and community-based supportive services is the Medical Assistance or
Medicaid program. 46
Medicaid is a program where costs are shared roughly half and half
between the states and the federal government. Each state adopts a Medicaid
“state plan” that includes certain federally mandated services, plus additional
optional services. 47 While some mandated services support independent living
for people with disabilities, such as home health care, many of the services that
are linked to supportive housing are optional, available only at the discretion of
the participating state. 48
Medicaid is hampered by an “institutional bias.” 49 Frail elders and people
with significant physical disabilities historically received and continue to
receive Medicaid-funded care in nursing homes and rehabilitation facilities.
Medicaid also pays for the costs of confining people with developmental
disabilities to large institutions and ICF/MR. “Medicaid does not cover
institutional costs for non-elderly adults with mental illness.” 50 This
circumstance dates to the inception of Medicaid, when Congress “feared that

44. Jacobi, supra note 3, at 1281.
45. Batavia, supra note 25, at 17.
46. Id. at 18 (citing Robyn I. Stone, Long-term Care for the Elderly with Disabilities:
Current Policy, Emerging Trends, and Implications for the Twenty-First Century, MILBANK
MEM. FUND 16, 13 (2000)).
47. Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, & Alexandra Stewart, Olmstead v. L.C.: Implications
for Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 93,
124-31 (2002).
48. See, e.g., HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra
note 24, at 44 (describing home health services).
49. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, OLMSTEAD: RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES
(Abridged Version) 34 (2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/
pdf/reclaimabridged.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007); see also LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
50. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 6.
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the costs of covering” the thousands of individuals housed in state hospitals
would overwhelm the program. 51 Amendments to the Medicaid statute now
offer states “the option of Medicaid reimbursement for individuals under the
age of twenty-two and over the age of sixty-four residing in psychiatric
hospitals.” 52 State funds continue to pay most of the costs of operating large
state psychiatric institutions for non-elderly adults with mental illnesses.
The change to the continuum model of care did not end Medicaid’s bias in
favor of institutions.
A “variety of models,” including “halfway
houses. . .family foster care, boarding homes. . .group residences,” short term
“apartments reserved for crisis intervention. . .[s]helters for homeless persons
and transitional or permanent ‘housing for the homeless’ have become the
latest in a series of quasi-institutional solutions to housing and support
needs.” 53 Both the institutional and the quasi-institutional models persist.
Nearly a million people with disabilities remain in ICF/MR, psychiatric
institutions, and board and care facilities. 54 Another 1.3 million people live in
nursing homes, and of these, 10.9 % are under the age of sixty-five. 55 In many
states nursing homes are the alternative to psychiatric hospitals for states
hoping to shift to the Medicaid program the cost of institutionalizing nonelderly adults with mental illnesses. Even though federal rules require
independent screening of admittees to avoid the practice, estimates are that as
many as twenty percent of the individuals between the ages of twenty-two and
sixty- four residing in nursing homes are people with a primary or secondary
diagnosis of mental illness. 56
As much as any one motivating factor, it was civil rights claims asserted
by people with disabilities during the 1970s that began the paradigm shift to
community-based services:
These cases consistently concluded that civil rights of individuals with [mental
retardation and developmental disabilities] in state institutions were being
violated and that these individuals were being forced to live in inhumane

51. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., SCREENING FOR MENTAL ILLNESS IN NURSING FACILITY APPLICANTS:
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 5, n.4 (2002) [hereinafter SCREENING FOR MENTAL
ILLNESS IN NURSING FACILITY APPLICANTS], available at http://download.ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/
pdf/SMA01-3543/CMHS2a.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
52. Id. at 5, n.4.
53. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 441.
54. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 49, at 11-18.
55. Id.
56. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
YOUNGER NURSING FACILITY RESIDENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: AN UNIDENTIFIED
POPULATION 9-10 (2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-99-00700.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007). For a detailed discussion of the screening requirements, see generally
SCREENING FOR MENTAL ILLNESS IN NURSING FACILITY APPLICANTS, supra note 51.
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conditions where physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, and physical and
medical neglect were the common experience. 57

Some litigation involved claims for deinstitutionalization and communitybased living opportunities, while other court decisions established a right to
treatment, education and training, freedom from unjustified physical restraint,
freedom from abuse and neglect, freedom from indefinite involuntary
confinement, and the opportunity for a fair procedure to determine the need for
confinement. Based on Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection,
liberty, and due process, as well as Section 504 and similar laws, the cases
anticipated the ADA-based claim in Olmstead. 58 While the courts endorsed
the principle that people with disabilities were entitled to receive services in a
“least restrictive alternative,” they also held that Section 504 does not prohibit
institutionalization. 59 The changes sparked by this litigation led to an indirect,
but crucial result. “The reforms of institutional care became a factor in further
deinstitutionalization because they increased institutional care costs (e.g.
requiring more staff, etc.).” 60 Due to the high costs of institutional care,
“combined with criticism of Medicaid’s institutional bias, states and the
Federal government began to look for ways to provide long-term care services
in less restrictive, more cost-effective ways.” 61
The Medicaid-funded system of community based services that emerged
from this background retains fundamental features of the institutional and
quasi-institutional forms of medical assistance that preceded it: Medicaid
continues in an institutional bias, and it continues to serve people by category
of disability. For example, basic Medicaid program rules require states to
57. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 4.
58. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 357 (1982) (restraint, neglect and abuse);
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 22 U.S. 563 (1975) (unconstitutional confinement); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (D.C. N.Y. 1973) (fair process); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221 (D.C. Pa. 1985) (right to
treatment).
59. See, e.g., Ky. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn., 674 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir.
1982) (Section 504 may require placement of people with developmental disabilities in least
restrictive alternative, but does not prohibit all forms of institutionalization; state may expend
funds to improve staffing and conditions in institutions); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act provides the right to least
restrictive environment); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 213-15 (D.C.N.H. 1981) (Section
504 does not broadly compel deinstitutionalization; it does require individual service plans for
individuals that may include independent living outside of institutions); cf. Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (Court approved class
action settlement which compelled the closure of an institution).
60. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 4.
61. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24,
at 7-8.
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provide an equal level of services to all qualified participants, without regard to
diagnosis. 62 However, under the Home and Community-Based Care Services
(HCBS) waiver program, states may apply to the Federal Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) for waiver of this “comparability” requirement
to assist only those “individuals who, in the absence of home care, would
require [an] institutional level [of] services and benefits.” 63 The HCBS waiver
program is intended to foster more integrated living situations for elders and
people with disabilities through a “broad variety of services that may be
provided as part of the program,” including adult day care and health services,
habilitation services, assistive technology and adaptive equipment, case
management, personal care attendants, respite care, and vocational services. 64
States participating in the HCBS waiver program “may vary the benefits they
offer by beneficiary sub-category,” (that is, they may restrict aid to certain
types of disabilities or to certain age groups of beneficiaries) including elders,
people with physical disabilities, people with developmental disabilities,
individuals with traumatic brain injury, and people who have AIDS. 65
Because of the historical prohibition on use of Medicaid to pay the costs of
confining non-elderly people in state psychiatric institutions, HCBS waivers
often do not serve people with mental illnesses. 66 States may choose to make
supportive services available to people with mental illnesses under provisions
for optional Medicaid services like personal care assistance, targeted case
management, clinic services, and psychiatric rehabilitation services. Like
HCBS waivers, these options are exempt from the Medicaid comparability
requirement, and many states elect to target optional services based on
category of disability, including mental illness. 67 Chronically homeless people

62. Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 128-29 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2006)); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006) (statutory “comparability” requirements).
63. Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 129.
64. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 16-17.
65. Id. at 2; see also ROSENBAUM, supra note 47, at 130; HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID
HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, at 49.
66. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. Recent legislation has de-coupled some waiver
services from eligibility standards requiring people with disabilities to show that they “would
require a level of provided in a hospital or a nursing facility or intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded” as a condition of qualifying for waiver services. See P.L. 109-171, § 6086
(Feb. 8, 2006), amending 42 U.S.C. §1396(n). By separating eligibility for waiver services from
need for Medicaid-covered institutional care, it is possible that more states may seek HCBS
waivers to serve people with mental illnesses.
67. See generally HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES,
supra note 24, at 60-67. For a detailed discussion of the provision of rehabilitation services to
people with mental illnesses see BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, RECOVERY IN
THE COMMUNITY: FUNDING MENTAL HEALTH REHABILITATIVE APPROACHES UNDER MEDICAID
(2001).
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may receive services offered through the substance abuse treatment system. 68
That system is also characterized by a history that begins with institutional
forms of treatment and a paradigm shift to community-based options. 69 And,
like other forms of supportive services, treatment for substance abuse is made
available through funding streams that serve only people with substance abuse
problems. 70
Medicaid expenditures exert tremendous fiscal pressures on state and
federal budgets. As a consequence, limitations on eligibility for communitybased services are designed to control cost. For example, HCBS waivers are
available only to those states that “demonstrate that on average, spending for
those receiving waiver services would not exceed the average cost of those in
institutions.” 71 Other strategies for limiting cost include “placing caps on
spending per recipient or limiting the number of participants,” imposing
limitations on program eligibility “by degree of impairment or financial need,”
and use of waiting lists. 72 They also rely on diagnosis-specific eligibility
criteria to target “services to those most likely to be institutionalized” in
facilities identified by category of disability. 73
There is one last feature of supportive services systems that derives in part
from the categorical organization of the old system of institutions, and in part
from the integrationist mandate of civil rights laws. Supportive services are
usually delivered not through a single agency, but through separate agencies
and organizations that are identified by type of disability. 74 Under Olmstead
the obligation to administer services in the most appropriate integrated setting
means that state agencies must maintain a “comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with. . . disabilities in less
restrictive settings, and a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not
controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated.” 75
The responsibility to develop a moving waiting list in the face of scarce
housing resources means the separate state agencies that maintain institutions
serving categories of people with disabilities must control the community
placements made available to their individual consumers. It is therefore
68. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 5.
69. Id.; Paul J. Carling & Laurie Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing: Current Trends
and Future Directions, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 81 (Summer 1997)
[hereinafter Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing].
70. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 19.
71. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 3. The cost neutrality standard was recently eased in
connection with certain types of waiver services. See, P.L. 109-171, §6086(a)(i)(1) (Feb. 8,
2006).
72. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 30.
73. Id.
74. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24,
at 148-52.
75. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 583 (1999) (emphasis added).
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common within the supportive service system that housing placements are only
available through agencies that demand control over the housing waiting list
and the “pipeline” of individuals that enter and move through the waiting list.
That imperative, though driven in part by the civil rights obligation to comply
with Olmstead, competes with the integrationist notions at work in housing
programs. It is a point of disconnect where the supportive services system and
the system of affordable housing fail to work together.
IV. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN HOUSING PROGRAMS
Medicaid and other forms of supportive services pay for the service
component of supportive housing. Service dollars do not pay for room, board,
or rent. 76 To create supportive housing opportunities, it is therefore essential
to find ways to assure that people with disabilities and chronically homeless
people also have access to mainstream affordable housing programs. 77
Federal, state, and local funds may all serve as sources of financing for
affordable housing. 78 As a practical matter, due to conditions of poverty,
housing is often affordable to people with disabilities only when it receives
capital funding from multiple state and federal sources, and rent subsidies,
usually federal rent subsidies, to supplement very modest tenant rent
contributions. 79 The federal housing resources available for these purposes are
characterized by an inconsistent mix of policies that tend to limit or forbid
preferences for people with specific categories of disability. At the same time,
federal housing policy often excludes people from mainstream affordable
housing opportunities based on their status as individuals with disabilities.
Some supportive housing is funded by programs administered through
HUD’s Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD). CPD
provides capital and operating support for homeless programs established
under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 80 the program of

76. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2006) (no HCBS payment for room and board); see also HHS,
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, at 58-59
(Medicaid payments under HCBS not available for room and board), 71 (no Medicaid payment
for residential costs of habilitation programs), 96 (Medicaid payment for assisted living services,
but not cost of housing).
77. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24,
at 97; HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 52-54.
78. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 21-23.
79. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 19; see also Joseph Harkness, Sandra Newman,
George Galster & James Reschovsky, The Financial Viability of Housing for Mentally Ill
Persons, 15 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 133, 139-40 (multiple capital subsidies), 153 (rental
subsidies) (FannieMae Foundation, 2004).
79. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 21-23.
80. P.L. 100-77 (Jul. 22, 1987), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11301, et seq. (2006).
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Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS (HOPWA), 81 and HOME
Investment Partnerships (HOME) program. 82 It is within these programs that
HUD policies display the greatest inconsistency. The statute governing
HOPWA requires that the program serve only people with AIDS and related
disorders. 83
The McKinney-Vento Shelter Plus Care program targets
assistance to eligible “homeless person with disabilities (primarily persons who
are seriously mentally ill, have chronic problems with alcohol, drugs, or both,
or have acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and related diseases).” 84 HUD
rules interpret the statute to say that providers may establish a preference for
people within a single category of eligible homeless individuals, but may
exclude other groups of homeless people with disabilities only when there is
sufficient demand for the housing within the target population, and only when
the other homeless people cannot benefit from the services offered by the
provider. 85 Current rules in the Supportive Housing Program (SHP) also allow
targeting of units to designated populations of people with disabilities. 86
Housing financed with funds provided to state or local jurisdictions from
the HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) program may include
“permanent housing for disabled homeless persons, transitional housing, and
single room occupancy housing.” 87 HOME funds may be used for both tenantbased rental assistance and capital funding for construction and
rehabilitation. 88 Use of HOME funds is subject to federal consolidated
planning requirements that mandate an assessment of community housing
needs, including the needs of people with disabilities. 89 Consolidated planning
standards instruct jurisdictions to review the needs of people who “may or may
not require supportive housing (i.e., elderly, frail elderly, persons with
disabilities (mental, physical, developmental), persons with alcohol or other
drug addiction, persons with HIV/AIDS and their families, and public housing
residents)” and to devise and carry out strategies intended to meet those
needs. 90
Despite the statutory and regulatory standards that seem to favor HOMEfunded supportive housing serving categories of people with disabilities,
81. AIDS Housing Opportunity Act, P.L. 101-625, § 851, et seq., codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12901, et seq. (2006).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12721, et seq. (2006).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12901 (2006).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 11403g (2006).
85. 24 C.F.R. § 582.330(a) (2006).
86. 24 C.F.R. § 583.325(a).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12742(a)(1).
88. Id.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 12746(5) (2006) (HOME is subject to consolidated planning
requirements for comprehensive housing affordability strategy); 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(1) and
(i)(2) (consolidated plan must address housing needs of people with disabilities).
90. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 91.215(e) (2006) (with respect to local jurisdictions).
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HUD’s implementation of the program is equivocal. Rules governing the use
of HOME for tenant-based rental assistance permit selection preferences “for a
specific category of individuals with disabilities (e.g. persons with HIV/AIDS
or chronic mental illness) if the specific category is identified in the
participating jurisdiction’s consolidated plan as having unmet need and the
preference is needed to narrow the gap in benefits and services to such
persons . . .[p]references cannot be administered in a manner that limits the
opportunities of persons” based on federal civil rights laws. 91 There are no
comparable regulations for capital use of HOME funds. Early guidance from
1997 indicates that while selection preferences may be offered to a category of
people with disabilities in housing using HOME capital funds, eligibility
cannot be limited to a category of people with disabilities. 92 Instead, “housing
projects of five or more HOME-assisted units must be affirmatively marketed
to all persons within the special needs group.” 93 In addition, “[A] project may
not be filled exclusively through referrals from a single social service
agency.” 94
Later policy statements from 2001 emphasized the availability of HOME
funds for “special needs housing,” including “such traditional housing as
single-family homes and apartments, as well as single room occupancy
housing and group homes.” 95 The 2001 policy showcased HOME projects that
served discrete populations, such as people with chronic mental illnesses, frail
elders, drug and alcohol dependent women, people with physical disabilities,
people with mental retardation, and people with HIV/AIDS. 96 Still later, in
2005, HOME program fair housing guidelines said that in special needs
housing for people with disabilities, “the housing must be marketed to all
individuals with disabilities and cannot be restricted to persons with specific
types of diagnoses or subclasses of persons with disabilities.” 97
Other housing programs display a similar range of sometimes
contradictory policies. In the public housing, tenant-based Section 8 Housing
Choice Voucher, and multifamily subsidized housing programs administered
by HUD, agency regulations permit selection preferences that favor people
with disabilities in general, but they explicitly forbid preferences that are

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

24 C.F.R. § 92.209(c)(3).
See HOMEfires, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct. 30, 1997).
Id.
Id.
HUD OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, HUD-2001-18-CPD,
SPECIAL NEEDS HOUSING AND THE HOME PROGRAM 1 (May 2001).
96. Id. at 25, 28 (mental illness), 26-27 (elders), 29 (chemically dependent women), 33
(physical and developmental disabilities), 37 (mental retardation), 35 (HIV/AIDS).
97. HUD OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, HUD-2005-10-CPD,
FAIR HOUSING FOR HOME PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS: UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS 9 (May
2005).
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targeted at people with a specific category of disability. 98 Other prohibitions
apply in HUD programs where supportive services are part of the program
design. The Section 811 program of Housing and Supportive Services for
People with Disabilities (Section 811) links capital grants, project rental
assistance contracts, and supportive services in housing serving people with
“physical, mental, or emotional impairment[s]” and individuals with
developmental disabilities. 99 Under program requirements, “[a]n Owner may,
with the approval of [HUD], limit occupancy. . . to persons with disabilities
who have similar disabilities and require a similar set of supportive services in
a supportive housing environment. However, the Owner must permit
occupancy by any qualified person with a disability who could benefit from the
housing and/or services provided regardless of the person’s disability.” 100
HUD’s Project-Based Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program adopts
a mix of approaches. Public housing agencies (PHA) are permitted to “projectbase” up to twenty percent of the PHA’s Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers
by entering into contracts with private owners to attach vouchers to units. 101 In
general, the percentage of assisted units in any building may not exceed
twenty-five percent. 102 The twenty-five percent per building cap does not
apply to dwelling units “specifically made available for households comprised
of elderly families, disabled families, and families receiving supportive
services,” making it clear that the program is intended in part to provide
supportive housing to people with disabilities. 103 Project-based voucher
providers may not limit admission by category of disability. 104 Providers may
limit eligibility to people “who need services offered at a particular project.” 105
Like the Section 811 program, an owner may “advertise the project as offering
services for a particular type of disability; however, the project must be open to
all otherwise eligible persons with disabilities who may benefit from services
provided in the project.” 106 Preferences that base admission on establishing
need for services are only permitted in order to serve individuals:
(i) . . .with disabilities that significantly interfere with their ability to obtain
and maintain themselves in housing; (ii) Who, without appropriate supportive

98. 24 C.F.R. § 5.655(c)(3) (2006) (multifamily subsidized housing); 24 C.F.R.
§960.206(b)(3) (2006) (public housing); 24 C.F.R. §982.207(b)(3) (2006) (tenant-based Housing
Choice Vouchers).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 8013(k)(2) (2006).
100. 24 C.F.R. § 891.410(c)(2) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 8013(i)(2) (similar effect).
101. See generally 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o)(13) (2006).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(13)(D)(ii) (2006).
103. See 24 C.F.R. § 983.251(d) (2006).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at (d)(3).
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services, will not be able to obtain or maintain themselves in housing; and (iii)
For whom such services cannot be provided in a nonsegregated setting. 107

The largest program providing capital funding for affordable housing is the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program administered by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 108 Acting through state housing credit
agencies, the program provides allocations of tax credits to housing developers
that sell the credits to investors to provide capital funds for the construction or
rehabilitation of rent restricted housing for low income households. 109
Supportive housing is a permissible use of tax credits. 110 Civil rights
requirements in the LIHTC program are embodied in a rule under which
dwelling units qualify for credits only if they are available “for use by the
general public.” 111 To meet this standard, tax credit units must be rented
consistent with HUD non-discrimination rules, including the provisions of a
HUD handbook governing multifamily subsidized housing programs. 112 In
addition, they must not be constructed for the exclusive use of a limited class
of people such as “a member of a social organization.” 113
In the single interpretive ruling addressing limitations based on type of
disability, the IRS said that low rent units qualify for tax credits where, for
example, they are part of a project for homeless individuals with a selection
preference for people with alcohol and chemical dependencies. 114 The

107. Id. at (d)(1).
108. HUD, THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
OWNERS 1 (Mar. 2000).
109. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2006).
110. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(c)(2) (properties with Section 8 moderate rehabilitation
assistance are ineligible for credits, except for housing for homeless people); 26 U.S.C. §
42(c)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (transient housing not permitted use in tax credit program except for housing
used exclusively to facilitate the transition of homeless individuals to independent living), §
42(c)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (to same effect, housing made available by government entities and nonprofits to provide homeless individuals with temporary housing and supportive services designed
to assist in locating and retaining permanent housing); 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(2)(B) (services that
“enable residents of a residential rental property to remain independent and avoid placement in a
hospital, nursing home, or intermediate care facility for the mentally or physically handicapped”);
26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(C)(v) (state qualified allocation plans for distribution of tax credits must
include selection criteria for “tenant populations with special needs”).
111. 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a) (2006).
112. Id. The handbook referenced in the rule is HUD HANDBOOK NO. 4350.3, REV-1,
OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSIDIZED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS (May 2003)
[hereinafter HUD, MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK].
113. 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(b). The general public use rule also forbids housing “provided by an
employer for its employees.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a). In addition, “any residential rental unit that
is part of a hospital, nursing home, sanitarium, lifecare facility, trailer park, or intermediate care
facility for the mentally and physically handicapped is not for use by the general public and is not
eligible for credit under Section 42.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(b).
114. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-14-006 (Apr. 3, 1998).
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selection preference was permitted only because the units were also made
available to all homeless applicants, without regard to disability. 115 The
general public use rule’s prohibition on limiting occupancy to members of a
particular class of individuals also suggests that a unit will not qualify for tax
credits if it is rented solely to consumers of a specific agency serving a
particular category of disability, a policy comparable to the one at work in
some HOME program guidance. 116
Despite the ethic of “nonsegregation” articulated in agency regulations, in
practice, HUD maintains policies that are designed to deliberately exclude
people with disabilities from federal housing programs. Prior to 1992,
apartments in HUD-administered “mixed-population” public housing and
multifamily housing developments were required to rent to non-elderly people
with disabilities and elders on an equal basis. 117 “The shift away from
institutional to community-based mental health care, recent regulations that
prohibit discrimination in housing, and the lack of affordable housing. . . all
contributed to growing numbers of” people with disabilities living in mixedpopulation housing. 118
Spurred on by concerns about “differences in values and lifestyle” as well
as complaints about people with mental illnesses, Congress enacted laws that
permit PHAs and owners of multifamily subsidized housing to limit and at
times exclude non-elders with disabilities from assisted housing. 119 Estimates
are that by 2001, the new policies resulted in a loss of access by people with
disabilities to 68,500 previously available public housing units, and between
200,000 to 225,000 assisted multifamily units. 120 The estimates do not
115. Id. The IRS ruling ignored provisions of the MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK
permitting “preferences for persons with a specific type of disability” when “allowed in the
controlling documents for the property.” See HUD, MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK,
supra note 115, para. 4-6(C)(3). The reference in the handbook to controlling documents is
meant to refer to contractual documents associated primarily with HUD’s Section 202 Direct
Loan Program.
116. See HOMEfires, Vol. 1, No. 4, supra note 95; cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-09-020 (1992)
(units in transitional housing facility for homeless families are available for use by the general
public for purposes of tax exempt bonds even where county social services agency is the sole
source of referrals).
117. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-81, PUBLIC HOUSING: HOUSING
PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES WITH THE ELDERLY (Aug. 1992).
118. Id. at 3.
119. See P.L. 102-550 (Oct. 21, 1992), Title VI-C, § 622(a), enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1437e
(2006) (PHAs may designate some or all of any public housing development solely for occupancy
by elders, solely for occupancy by people with disabilities, or for mixed use); Title VI-D, § 641,
et seq., enacting 42 U.S.C. § 13601, et seq. (2006) (owners of multifamily subsidized housing
may limit or exclude occupancy by non-elders with disabilities).
120. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities and Technical Assistance Collaborative,
OPENING DOORS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? 5 (public housing), 15 (multifamily
housing) (2001).
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measure the level of exclusion from HUD-funded housing based on the actions
of housing providers who disregard even the limited protections available to
people with disabilities under these laws. There is compelling evidence that
disability discrimination plays a significant role in additional limitations on
access to mainstream affordable housing opportunities. 121 This combination of
legally permitted exclusion and unlawful discrimination against people with
disabilities stands in stark contrast to the desire to create “nonsegregated”
housing opportunities embodied in federal housing policies.
V. COMPETING CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION?
The federal trend towards forbidding occupancy standards based on
category of disability is not necessarily reflected in state laws, particularly
those laws that are focused on the command of Olmstead to provide
community-based housing options outside of institutions. States use a variety
of funding mechanisms to plan and provide for community-based housing for
people with mental illnesses, people with mental retardation and related
conditions, and people with chemical dependencies. Some of these sources of
financing are linked directly to services provided under HCBS waivers, and
therefore limit occupancy based on category of disability. Others result in
housing that is limited to consumers of the services of particular mental health
or homeless agencies. 122
121. See HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
ASSESSMENT OF THE LOSS OF HOUSING FOR NON-ELDERLY PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, FINAL
REPORT 5-2 (2000) (managers of assisted multifamily housing “report illegal practices that
discourage people with disabilities from applying for HUD-assisted housing even though the
potential applicant is eligible under the property’s occupancy policy”); see also Matyasovszky v.
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport, 226 F.R.D. 35 (D. Conn. 2005) (certifying class
action complaint alleging unlawful discrimination in exclusion of people with disabilities from
public housing); Bailey v. Housing Authority of the City of Baltimore, JFM-02-CV-225 (Dec. 20,
2004); U.S. v. Housing Authority of the City of Baltimore, JFM-04-CV-03107(Dec. 20, 2004)
(consent decree, discriminatory exclusion of people with disabilities from public housing),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/habc3settle.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2007).
122. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 53260 (West 2006) (“supportive housing” is
housing occupied by a “target population,” defined as low-income adults with one or more
disabilities, including mental illnesses, HIV or AIDS, substance abuse, people with
developmental disabilities, and others); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-485 (2006) (Community Mental
Health Strategic Investment Fund for new and expanded clinical services and supportive housing
for people with mental health needs); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-337(a) (2006) (long term care
plan for elders must include home and community-based services and supportive housing); ILL.
COMP. STAT. Ch. 405, § 30/4.4 (2006) (savings from reduction in institutional services redirected
to “create an array of residential and community-based support services to people with mental
health needs and developmental disabilities”); MASS. SPEC. L. ch. S7, § 2 (West 1992)
(Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency authorized to make loans for provision of communitybased residences to people with disabilities); 2004 Mass. Acts ch. 290, line 4000-8200 (West
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In an environment where it is almost always necessary to combine state
and federal resources to develop supportive housing, it can be difficult to
reconcile the targeted nature of state funding in service of Olmstead with
HUD’s competing prohibition on limiting occupancy to people with specific
disabilities. HUD regulations prohibiting preferences based on category of
disability are not themselves civil rights laws. They are “civil rights-related
program requirements,” intended to interpret civil rights statutes in the context
of specific housing programs. 123 It is another curious feature of HUD housing
programs that in contrast to civil rights-related program requirements, civil
rights laws protecting people with disabilities do not preclude housing
programs serving a category of people with disabilities so long as the programs
serve integrative purposes.
Under HUD Fair Housing Act rules, for example, it is permissible to
inquire about disability when necessary “to determine whether an applicant is
qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with handicaps (sic) or to
persons with a particular type of handicap” or “to determine whether an
applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a priority available to persons with
handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap.” 124 It is, however,
unlawful to assign “any person to a particular section of a community,
neighborhood or development, or to a particular floor of a building” based on
disability. 125

2004) (funding for community-based housing for people with mental illnesses and mental
retardation, including clients of state Departments of Mental Health and Mental Retardation);
2004 Mass. Acts ch. 290, line 4000-8201 (West 2004) (to same effect, for other people with
disabilities at risk of institutionalization); MINN. STAT. § 252.50 (2003) (community-based
housing for people with mental retardation or related conditions linking housing programs of state
housing finance agency and HCBS waiver services); MO. REV. STAT. § 215.054 (2000) (Mental
Health Trust Fund to establish community-based housing for clients of the Department of Mental
Health who have a mental illness, developmental disabilities, or are chemically dependent); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 68-1605 (2003) (Homeless Shelter Assistance Trust Fund to finance grants for
projects that provide for “persons or families with special housing needs”); WASH. REV. CODE §
43.79.201 (1998) (funds appropriated for community-based housing for people with mental
illnesses, developmental disabilities, or “youth who are blind, deaf or otherwise disabled”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14.400 (2000) (portion of sales and use tax for zoos, aquarium and
wildlife preserves transferred to Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development
to maintain community-based housing for people with mental illnesses).
123. See 60 Fed. Reg. 14294 (Mar. 16, 1995) (civil rights-related program requirements
(CRRPRs) “may be written into the statute or regulations governing the specific program at issue.
CRRPRs may also be found within such sources as general civil rights statutes, HUD Notices of
Funding Availability (NOFAs), and Mortgagee Letters. The subjects covered under CRRPRs
include but are not limited to such topics as affirmative fair housing marketing, site and
neighborhood standards, assurances or certifications of compliance with civil rights statutes, and
monitoring recipient performance for compliance with civil rights requirements”).
124. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2), (3) (2006).
125. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(4) (2006).
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Title VIII’s balance between integration and recognition of disability is
more fully developed in Section 504 and the ADA. Section 504 and ADA
rules are modeled on similar rules that implement prohibitions against
discrimination based on race, color, and ethnicity under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and discrimination based on gender under Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972. 126 There is, however, a fundamental
difference between principles of disability discrimination and the law of race
and gender discrimination:
The premise of both title VI and title IX is that there are no inherent
differences or inequalities between the general public and the persons
protected by these statutes and, therefore, there should be no differential
treatment in the administration of Federal programs. The concept of section
504, on the other hand, is far more complex. Handicapped persons may
require different treatment in order to be afforded equal access to federally
assisted programs and activities, and identical treatment may, in fact, constitute
discrimination. The problem of establishing general rules as to when different
treatment is prohibited or required is compounded by the diversity of existing
handicaps and the differing degree to which particular persons may be
affected. Thus, under section 504, questions arise as to when different
treatment of handicapped persons should be considered improper and when it
should be required. 127

Section 504 and ADA attempt to resolve these questions by recognizing
that “different or special treatment” is permitted only “in order to assure equal
opportunity.” 128 HUD Section 504 rules and ADA Title II rules are explicit:
different or separate services and benefits are permitted, and in some
circumstances may be required when necessary to provide an “opportunity that
is as effective as offered to others.” 129 The statutory provisions of Title III of
the ADA are identical. 130 Title III is applicable to supportive housing because
it prohibits disability discrimination in places of public accommodation,
including social service centers such as “substance abuse treatment centers,

126. See 41 Fed. Reg. 20295, 20296 (May 17, 1976) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84)
(preamble to proposed Section 504 rules for Department of Health, Education and Welfare); 42
Fed. Reg. 22675, 22676 (May 4, 1977) (preamble to final HEW Section 504 rules); 43 Fed. Reg.
2131, 2132 (Jan.13, 1978) (preamble to HEW Section 504 coordination rules for federal
agencies); 48 Fed. Reg. 20637, 20639 (May 6, 1983) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 8) (preamble
to proposed HUD Section 504 rules). Title VI is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). Title IX
is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (2006).
127. 41 Fed. Reg. 20296; 48 Fed. Reg. 20639.
128. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676.
129. 24 C.F.R. § 8. 4(b)(1)(iv) (HUD §504 rules); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (ADA Title II
regulations).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(iii) (separate programs for categories of people with
disabilities are permitted when necessary to provide an “opportunity that is as effective as offered
to others”).
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rape crisis centers, and halfway houses. . . residential facilities that provide
social services, including homeless shelters, shelters for people seeking refuge
from domestic violence, nursing homes, residential care facilities, and other
facilities where persons may reside for varying lengths of time” while
receiving supportive services. 131
The ADA Title II regulation that is the foundation of Olmstead is an
extension of these ideas. In promulgating the rule, the Department of Justice
said that the Title II “most integrated setting” rules are founded on explicit
Congressional “authority for separate programs in the specific requirements of
title III of the Act.” 132 HUD civil rights-related program requirements that
forbid categorical preferences originate from a different vantage. They derive
from a fair housing perspective that is more closely aligned to Title VI and
Title IX: protected characteristics should, in the first instance, be neutral and
invisible in the distribution of housing opportunities. There is considerable
conflict within this point of view, especially because HUD and other federal
agencies are obliged by law to “administer their programs and activities
relating to housing and urban development. . . in a manner to affirmatively
further the purposes of” fair housing. 133 The contradictory impulses are most
evident in the context of race, where the courts have long struggled with the
circumstances under which it is appropriate to make race-conscious decisions
about preferences for admission in order to preserve or promote integrated
patterns of residential living. 134
The same tensions filtered into debates about HUD fair housing policies in
the promulgation of Title VIII rules for the implementation of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, which added protections to the Fair Housing Act for

131. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(K) (Title III definition of “public accommodation”); see also 56
Fed. Reg. 35544, 35551 (Jul. 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (discussing Title III
definition of “public accommodation”).
132. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35703, 35705 (Jul. 26, 1991). These principles also have a
constitutional dimension. In applying Fourteenth Amendment concepts of equal protection to the
rights of people with disabilities, the courts say that classifications based on disability are, unlike
racial classifications, entitled to considerable deference because, among other reasons, “singling
out the [individuals with disabilities] for special treatment reflects the real and undeniable
differences between” them and people without disabilities, and among people with different
disabilities. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443, 444
(1985).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006).
134. Cf. Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 987 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting selection of
site for construction of housing in implementation of civil rights consent decree based on racial
characteristics of neighborhood); U.S. v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100-1101 (2d Cir.
1988) (rejecting selection practices intended to stabilize racial composition of housing
development), with Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 44
(1998) (use of race conscious marketing targets to establish occupancy patterns in assisted
housing is lawful for purposes of implementing civil right consent decree).
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people with disabilities and families with children. 135 On the one hand, civil
rights advocates “interpreted certain illustrations of conduct made unlawful in
the proposed rule as prohibiting the use of governmentally approved programs
designed to promote greater housing opportunities.” 136 On the other hand, “a
comment from an association representing persons involved in the sale and
rental of dwellings urged that the proposed rule be revised to make it clear that
such practices are prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.” 137 Noting that in
making changes to Title VIII, Congress debated and postponed action on
proposals to outlaw “preferences in the provision of any dwelling based on
race, color, religion, gender or national origin,” HUD chose against addressing
questions of affirmative action, determining “that it would not be appropriate
to address the issue of pro-integration programs in this final rule.” 138 To the
extent that current HUD rules permit activities that account for protected
characteristics, those activities are limited to imposing requirements on HUDassisted multifamily owners “to identify any groups of persons who are not
likely to be aware of the available housing and to undertake special marketing
efforts designed to make such persons aware of the available housing and their
ability to obtain it on a nondiscriminatory basis.” 139
The cautionary tensions inherent in allowing housing practices based on
protected characteristics have a particular import for people with disabilities.
Such practices often have the effect of excluding people with disfavored
disabilities from mainstream housing opportunities.
For example,
longstanding provisions of agency Section 504 rules permit “[n]onhandicapped persons” to be “excluded from the benefits of a program” and
allow the exclusion of a “specific class of individuals with handicaps,” if the
program “is limited by Federal statute or executive order to” people with
disabilities, or a “class of individuals” with disabilities. 140 The regulations are
intended to exempt such federal programs as the Section 202 program of

135. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 was passed as P.L. 100-430 (September 13,
1988). For provisions adding protections for families with children and people with disabilities,
see, e.g., P.L. 100-430, §6(b)(2) (families with children) and §6(b)(1) (people with disabilities),
enacting 42 U.S.C. §3604(a)-(e) (2006).
136. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3234-3235 (Jan. 23, 1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 54 Fed. Reg. 3235; see also 24 C.F.R. § 200.600, et seq; 24 C.F.R. § 108.1, et seq
(affirmative fair housing marketing requirements for multifamily owners); 24 C.F.R. § 92.351 (to
same effect, HOME program).
140. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(c)(1) (2006) (HUD Section 504 rules). The same standards are
applicable to all federal agencies through the Section 504 coordinating regulations published by
the U.S. Department of Justice. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (2006).
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housing for elders and people with disabilities from the integrationist and equal
opportunity mandates of Section 504. 141
In the Section 202 program, HUD allows housing providers to select
applicants from favored categories such as people with physical disabilities. 142
The policies decidedly do not operate to enhance equal opportunity. Rather,
they operate for the explicit purpose of excluding people with mental illnesses
and developmental disabilities from Section 202 units. 143 Policies like these
have another discriminatory effect. They tend to concentrate people with
disabilities in the group homes and halfway houses that are characteristic of
continuum facilities. In the wake of implementing formal policies for
excluding people with disabilities from Section 202 properties, HUD noted that
barely 10% of the previously available units in the program remained available
to people with disabilities. 144 Of those, 75% were located in group homes
serving only “persons with chronic mental illness or developmental

141. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20216, 20220 (Jun. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 8)
(promulgating interim Section 504 regulations for programs receiving HUD assistance)
(exclusion of categories of people with disabilities “does not violate Section 504” when
authorized by statute or executive order). The analogous provision under Title II of the ADA
allows categorical exclusions only in limited circumstances, enabling public entities to “provide
special benefits, beyond those required by the nondiscrimination requirements of [the ADA], that
are limited to individuals with disabilities or a particular class of individuals with disabilities,
without thereby incurring additional obligations to persons without disabilities or to other classes
of individuals with disabilities.” 56 Fed. Reg. 35693, 35705 (Jul. 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing purpose of 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c)). For another example of a statutory
program designed to serve people within a single category of disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12901, et
seq. (2006) (Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS).
142. 53 Fed. Reg. 20220 (Jun. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 8); see also
MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY Handbook, supra note 112, at para. 3-18(B)(2)(c)(3), (7) (10% of
units in §202 properties for elders are set aside for any person with disabilities with mobility
impairments; only elders qualify for remaining units and individuals with non-qualified
disabilities who are not elders do not qualify). The exclusions imposed by these occupancy
standards apply to properties developed under the Section 202 Direct Loan Program in effect
from 1959 to 1990. Id. Statutory changes in 1990 separated housing for people with disabilities
from the Section 202 program by creating two new programs; a new Section 202 program of
housing and supportive services for elders, and a companion Section 811 program of housing and
supportive services for people with disabilities. See P.L. 101-625, Title VIII, § 801(a) (Nov. 28,
1990), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (§ 202) and at Title VIII, § 811, adding 42 U.S.C. § 8013 (§
811). References in this section of the paper are to the pre-1990 version of the Section 202
program.
143. See Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1999)
(excluding person with mental illness); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343
(10th Cir. 1987) (excluding people with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities); Brecker
v. Queens B’nai B’rith Housing Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1986) (excluding
applicant with “mild mental retardation”); Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(limiting occupancy to “wheelchair users”).
144. HUD NOTICE H 93-36 (Jun. 2, 1993).
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disabilities.” 145 There is a practical import to this sort of segregation.
Fragmentation in housing and services by diagnosis often result in a denial of
opportunities to individuals who can benefit from a particular program but are
rejected because they are people with multiple disabilities, or because their
disability does not precisely fit the category served in the program. 146
Diagnosis-identified supportive housing implicates other important rights.
Disability rights laws aim at ending discrimination based on “presumptions,
patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities.
Consistent with these standards, public entities are required to ensure that their
actions are based on facts applicable to individuals,” not group
characteristics. 147 In housing where both units and services are dedicated to
particular categories of people with disabilities served by particular agencies,
“every person served represents an income stream” and “people with
disabilities are reduced to commodities.” 148 The concept of equal opportunity
means that services are provided in the communities where people live so that
an individual with disabilities has a choice of housing options that are not
limited by diagnosis or need for support. 149 Linking supportive services to
specific dwelling units limits that choice. It requires people with disabilities to
live in segregated places they might not choose, outside of the communities
with which they identify, and, at least in group home or congregate settings,
with people they do not select as partners. 150 Rights of privacy, autonomy, and
liberty protect the physical person against intrusion, assuring that an individual
cannot be forced to receive medical or therapeutic treatment against consent
and protecting “choices about and control over one’s environment.” 151 The
idea of equal treatment means that people with disabilities are not subjected to
different or unequal terms and conditions in their occupancy of housing. 152

145. Id.
146. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 4, 35, 98; HHS, UNDERSTANDING
MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, at 104, 145.
147. 56 Fed. Reg. 35705 (July 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35).
148. Allen, supra note 1, at 503.
149. 56 Fed. Reg. 35705; see also 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2) (existence
of programs solely for people with disabilities cannot serve as basis for curtailing opportunity in
housing, benefits, and services available to general public).
150. Carling & Curtis, supra note 69, at 81; see also Henry Korman, Diane Engster & Bonnie
M. Milstein, Housing as a Tool of Coercion, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY
TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 96 (Deborah L. Dennis & John
Monahan eds., 1996) [hereinafter Korman et al., Housing as a Tool of Coercion] (“communitybased residential treatment programs” represent places where people “live with others not of their
own choosing. . .”).
151. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 442; see
also Greenwood, supra note 4, at 225 (continuum approach to providing services to homeless
people with disabilities “undermines consumers’ autonomy”).
152. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(1).
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These concepts are undermined where housing is contingent on acquiescence
to a treatment plan, 153 or when the ability to retain possession of the housing is
not protected by the rights of judicial process afforded to most tenants. 154
Thus, there are compelling arguments against supportive housing programs
that are segregated by disability, notwithstanding the fact that they are not
explicitly prohibited by fair housing and civil rights laws. Nonetheless, the
challenge remains. In an atmosphere of scarce housing and service resources,
is it possible to develop affordable housing opportunities for people with
disabilities that offer support with community-based living when they want the
housing, where they want the housing, and on terms and conditions that do not
result in different treatment?
VI. FOCUS ON THE PERSON AND THE PLACE
History proves that separating people with disabilities from the mainstream
through segregation in diagnosis-specific settings can result in abuse,
disempowerment, isolation and neglect. On the other hand, the earliest
advocates of disability rights thought that the “Failure to make necessary
distinctions among the varieties of. . . disability is common alike to popular
and professional thought, with consequences often destructive to the
effectiveness of social provisions intended for welfare and rehabilitation.” 155
Martha Minnow, writing about how such “categorical approaches. . .
undermine commitments to equality,” argued that what matters is not disregard
of difference, but rather, an emphasis on human relationships in which there is
a “shared ‘right’ to be included and to participate in society-on terms that may

153. Korman et al., Housing as a Tool of Coercion, supra note 150, at 96; Michael Allen,
Separate and Unequal: The Struggle of Tenants with Mental Illness to Maintain Housing, 30
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 720, 725-727 (1996).
154. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cohen, 453 F.3d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 2006) (occupants may be
evicted by police from transitional homeless shelter without process of any kind); Cotton v.
Alexian Bros. Bonaventure House, No. 02-C-7969, 2003 WL 22110501, at *6 (D. Ill. 2003)
(right to occupy transitional housing for people with HIV/AIDS may be terminated by
administrative proceeding without judicial process); Padilla v. Padula, 1994 WL 879788, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1994) (to same effect, transitional housing for homeless people); Angelo J.
Melillo Ctr. for Mental Health v. Denise B., 777 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dist. Ct. 2004) (subsidized
provider of supportive housing may terminate license to occupy based on refusal to accept
treatment); Helping Out People Everywhere v. Deich, 589 N.Y.S.2d 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(termination of license agreement in emergency shelter); Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon
Chapter Five, 103 P.3d 1184 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (resident of halfway house for recovering
addicts may be evicted with fifteen minutes notice); Sunrise Group Homes, Inc. v. Ferguson, 777
P.2d 553 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (defenses to eviction available to tenants under landlord-tenant
act not available to resident of congregate living facility for people with developmental
disabilities).
155. Jacobus Tenbroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 809, 811 (1966).
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vary for each individual, but that may also entail special rights to make
inclusion and participation possible.” 156 Recognition of difference within a
context of a human relationship results in practical but crucial legal outcomes,
requiring, for example, reasonable individualized modifications in policies and
procedures to ensure “effective and meaningful” access to jobs, education,
housing and services, removal of structural barriers and construction of
architecturally accessible facilities and buildings to assure that they are “usable
to people with disabilities.” 157
Here is the practical dilemma: Supportive services programs are in the
process of casting off old, discriminatory practices that isolate people with
disabilities in segregated, institutional settings by category of disability. High
levels of poverty, the absence of affordable housing, the needs of people with
significant disabilities for support in independent living, the history of
isolation, and the scarcity of funds to undo that history require supportive
service providers to command housing and service resources following the old
institutional patterns- by category of disability. Housing programs hold fast to
the core fair housing ethic that protected characteristics should be neutral
factors in the distribution of housing benefits.
With larger commitments of resources, it might be easier for supportive
service programs to address the needs of people with disabilities without
regard to diagnosis, and in a “single point of entry” system where one agency
administers services for all people with disabilities, instead of multiple
agencies identified by category of disability. 158 Housing programs face similar
problems of scarce resources and suffer from competing impulses that operate
to exclude people with disabilities from mainstream assisted housing based on
the very characteristics that from a fair housing perspective ought to be
disregarded. The clash of integrationist ideals from this perspective may be as
much a conflict between civil rights theory and civil rights practice as anything
else.
Perhaps the answer to the question of whether housing programs can truly
work with supportive service programs lies in the basic insight of the Olmstead
court that “unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a
form of discrimination . . . .” 159 The court’s conclusion “reflects two evident
judgments” about integration and people with disabilities:

156. Martha Minnow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111,
112-3, 189 (1987).
157. Silverstein, supra note 19, at 1723.
158. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24,
at 149.
159. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 596 (1999).
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First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life . . .
Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment . . . Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect:
In order to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities
must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life
they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without
mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar
sacrifice. 160

This observation in Olmstead suggests the core of an answer to the
dilemma posed by the disconnect between the provision of services on a
categorical basis and the prohibition in housing programs on serving categories
of people with disabilities. A system of housing and supportive services must
first proceed with respect for and attention to the needs and desires of the
individual person, not the imperatives of the service provider, nor the category
of disability served by the provider. The design of the supportive housing
must preserve and enhance human relationships, and nurture full and integrated
participation in the “family relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment” 161 that are
the stuff of community life. Supportive housing cannot result in “dissimilar
treatment;” 162 that is, it should look like the “options available to the general
public,” rights of occupancy should not be associated with contingencies that
differ from those available to the general public, and it should not require
people with disabilities to relinquish choice of location, type of housing, or
control over treatment decisions. 163
These are principles that shift the focus away from legalistic concerns to
considerations about ethical boundaries and relationships, imposing “clearer
responsibility on the consumer for success” while at the same time
“dramatically changing the role of staff.” 164 A successful cultural shift in this
direction results in housing with features that conform to two integrationist
frameworks; the framework that emerges from Olmstead and efforts to
deinstitutionalize systems that serve people with disabilities, and the fair

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing, supra note 69, at 91.
164. Id.; see also Allen, supra note 153, at 730 (“The promise of full integration of consumers
into the community depends on equal treatment. Under such a scenario, access to housing would
be a function of an individual’s ability to comply with the same rules of tenancy that apply to all
tenants. . .”).
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housing framework that avoids distribution of housing resources based on
protected characteristics. This approach is outcome oriented. It is the needs
and desires expressed by the individual, the features of the housing, and the
conditions under which the housing is linked to supportive services that matter.
Within such a cultural shift, it should not matter whether eligibility for
admission is based on category of disability.
Operationally, a supportive housing system that marks the cultural shift
would have the following features:
• Supportive housing within a larger regime of meaningful choice. Some
people with significant disabilities choose structured, less integrated settings
based on their individual desire for particular kinds and levels of support. 165
However, “people with psychiatric” and other “disabilities generally want the
same kinds of housing that other citizens want.” 166 They want independent,
affordable apartments or houses, with voluntary access to support. 167
The existence of programs that serve only people with disabilities, or only
people with particular disabilities cannot be a reason to curtail the availability
of housing otherwise available to the general public. 168 One measure of
progress towards integration is the achievement of conditions where
“individuals of similar income levels in the same housing market area have a
like range of housing choices available to them regardless of their race, color,
This
religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin.” 169
understanding of integration derives from the obligation to affirmatively
further fair housing under the Fair Housing Act. 170 The responsibility to
further fair housing is one that is also imposed through program statutes and
agency regulations on virtually every recipient of federal housing funds,
including recipients of HUD housing subsidies and capital advances, HOME
funds, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits. 171 The duty is fulfilled, in part,

165. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 8, 27; HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND
RESEARCH, PREDICTING STAYING IN OR LEAVING PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING THAT
SERVES HOMELESS PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 75 (2006) [hereinafter HUD,
STAYING IN OR LEAVING].
166. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 442.
167. Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing supra note 69, at 84.
168. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2).
169. 24 C.F.R. § 200.610.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d); see also NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) (the codification of a duty to further fair housing reflects
the congressional desire “to fulfill. . . the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns and
to prevent the increase of segregation” and “to assist in ending discrimination and segregation to
the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases”).
171. For a discussion of how the federal obligations devolve to the state and local level, see
generally Henry Korman, Underwriting for Fair Housing? Achieving Civil Rights Goals in
Affordable Housing Programs, 14 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. L. 292
(2005) [hereinafter Korman, Underwriting for Fair Housing].
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through the utilization of “some institutionalized method whereby. . . [the
agency] has before it the relevant racial and socio-economic information
necessary for compliance with its duties.” 172
There are ready “institutionalized methods” available to supportive service
and housing providers through which it is possible to assure that supportive
housing generally, and supportive housing dedicated to people with one type of
disability is part of a larger regime of available housing opportunity. Through
the intervention of CMS, state supportive services agencies are familiar with
the responsibility imposed by Olmstead to develop “a comprehensive,
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with. . .disabilities in
less restrictive settings.” 173 State housing credit agencies also have the
obligation to further fair housing. 174 They can do so through the Qualified
Allocation Plans that federal law requires for the distribution of Low-Income
Housing Tax Credits. 175 PHAs receiving public housing subsidies and Section
8 Housing Choice Voucher funds, and state and local recipients of HUD
community planning and development funds such as HOME, Community
Development Block Grants, and McKinney-Vento homeless funding are
obliged to develop comprehensive plans that include activities to further fair
housing. 176 So far, few Olmstead “planning groups include representatives of
state housing” agencies. 177 Nevertheless, HUD has significant approval,
monitoring, and enforcement responsibilities in the adoption of jurisdictional
housing plans. 178 That oversight can be exercised to assure that in the
administration federal housing resources, people with disabilities have access
to a broad range of housing opportunities, including supportive housing that
172. Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970).
173. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 583; see also ALEXANDRA STEWART, JOEL
TEITELBAUM & SARA ROSENBAUM, IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY INTEGRATION: A REVIEW OF
STATE OLMSTEAD PLANS 3 (Center for Health Care Strategies, Inc., Working Paper No. CA 233802) (2002), available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/ImplementingIntegration.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2, 2007) (describing guidance to state Medicaid directors after Olmstead decision).
174. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan,
848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d
871 (8th Cir. 2003).
175. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m).
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(15)(2005) (public housing); 42 U.S.C. § 5318(c)(3) (2005)
(CDBG); 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(15) (2005) (HOME).
177. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 49, at 174.
178. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 8.56 (2006) (§ 504 investigations, monitoring and compliance); 24
C.F.R. § 91.215(l) (2006) (local strategic housing plan must describe activities to enhance
coordination between public and assisted housing providers and private and governmental health,
mental health, and service agencies); 24 C.F.R. § 91.315(l) (to same effect, state strategic plan);
24 C.F.R. § 91.315(m) (2006) (state plan must describe strategy to coordinate use of HUD funds
with LIHTC); 24 C.F.R. § 91.500 (2006) (HUD review and approval of consolidated plans); 24
C.F.R. § 903.23, § 903.25 (2006) (approval and compliance monitoring of public housing agency
plans).
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serves people with categories of disabilities, as well as including other
affordable housing available to the general public.
• Necessity and efficacy in the link between housing and supportive
services. It is worth stating once again the civil rights conditions under which
separate housing for people with disabilities is permissible: segregated settings
are appropriate only when necessary to provide “qualified individuals with
[disabilities] with housing aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those
provided to others.” 179
Research indicates that “the effectiveness of
transitional halfway houses in reducing recidivism, improving economic selfsufficiency, and improving community adjustment [is] ‘highly suspect.’” 180
The relative lack of efficacy in bundled housing for people with disabilities is
most evident in studies that compare HUD’s Continuum of Care approach to
providing services to chronically homeless people with an alternative approach
known as Housing First.
The “Continuum of Care model graduates” homeless individuals “through
a series of stages,” including “emergency shelter, transitional housing, and then
finally to supportive and/or permanent housing, but only if the individual
complies with prescribed treatment through ‘supportive services’. . .Failure to
comply at any level or a relapse into using alcohol or drugs may incur a return
to a more restrictive environment.” 181 In contrast, the “Housing First
program’s first priority is to stabilize people in the short-term and help them
get housed immediately.” 182 The program “provides a [subsidized] apartment
without any prerequisites for psychiatric treatment or sobriety. In addition to
an apartment, consumers are offered treatment by the program’s Assertive
Community Treatment (ACT) team.” 183 Comparing outcomes for participants
in Continuum of Care programs with those of participants in a Housing First
program, one study found that Housing First “participants experienced a
decrease in psychiatric symptoms . . . and smaller proportions of time
homeless” even though the participants also “reported lower service
utilization.” 184
While some Housing First programs serve all homeless families as the
target population, others are aimed exclusively at “those with mental health

179.
180.
181.
182.

24 C.F.R. § 8. 4(b)(1)(iv); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (emphasis added).
Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 441.
Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 224.
NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, INC., HOUSING FIRST FOR FAMILIES:
RESEARCH TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HOUSING FIRST FOR FAMILIES TRAINING
CURRICULUM 3 (2004), available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/pub/HousingFirst
Research.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
183. Sam Tsemberis, Leyla Gulcur & Maria Nakae, Housing First, Consumer Choice, and
Harm Reduction for Homeless Individuals with a Dual Diagnosis, 94 AMERICAN J. OF PUB.
HEALTH 651, 657 (2004).
184. Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 224-225.
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and substance use issues.” 185 Nevertheless, Housing First qualifies as a
supportive housing program that is consistent with civil rights principles for at
least three reasons. The characteristics of the housing are the same as the sort
of housing available to the general public. Supportive services are voluntary.
Finally, when participation is limited to people within a category of disability,
that limitation is effective in reducing barriers to stable housing for people
whose disabilities might otherwise prevent equal access.
• Matching people to services; not disabilities to units. Disability
discrimination laws require that decisions about the distribution of housing and
services must be “based on facts applicable to individuals and not on
presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot
do.” 186 In practical terms, this principle means that applicants for supportive
housing qualify for admission not because of their relationship to a diagnosisidentified service provider, but instead because they can benefit from the
services offered in connection with the housing. They should not be refused
admission because they are not clients of the service agency at the time of
application and selection. This approach is the one taken in the 1997 HOME
program guidance. 187 A related concept is that people with multiple
disabilities must not be excluded because they have some other disability in
combination with the disability for which the services are primarily
designed. 188
• Services are separate from housing. The Housing First model in which
services are voluntary and follow the person to their home is also responsive to
the ideas of privacy and autonomy. It is based on the research finding that
. . .a lack of personal control and choice, rather than too much of it is
associated with the experience of psychiatric symptoms. Models that make
housing contingent on relinquishment of control over daily living practices and
preferences actually erode an important tool for coping with the very
circumstances they are intended to redress. Programs that are designed to
restore choice and enhance perceptions of personal control may actually be
more successful in the reduction of psychiatric symptoms. . . . 189

This approach understands that “housing needs are separate from the needs
for treatment.” It aims for “a highly individualized set of service relationships
with individual consumers living in various housing situations.” It means that
185. NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, INC., supra note 182, at 23.
186. 56 Fed. Reg. 35693, 35703 (Jul. 26, 1991) (promulgating ADA Title II rules) (emphasis
added).
187. See HOMEfires, supra note 95.
188. Chapa v. Adams, 168 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1999); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 42200 (person with blindness may not be excluded from office of cancer specialist on account of
visual impairment) (1993).
189. Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 234 (emphasis in original).
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services are voluntary, and that they are “flexible, portable,” and available “on
demand.” 190
• Rights of occupancy are not diminished. Closely associated with the
concept that services should be voluntary is the idea that people with
disabilities should not be subjected to different terms and conditions and lesser
privileges of occupancy simply because their housing is also a place where
they might receive services. 191 Housing linked to services often violates this
principle by diminishing the possessory rights of program participants to the
units they occupy through the use of license agreements that allow for
summary termination of tenancy with little or no procedural protections. 192
Using mainstream housing resources in supportive housing protect these rights
simply because rules in the HOME, Project-Based Voucher, LIHTC, and
similar programs require the use of leases, guard against eviction except for
good cause, and forbid “summary eviction,” including summary eviction
without process for “failure to comply with program requirements.” 193 In any
case, it ought to be a principle of supportive housing that the housing is
permanent, and continued occupancy is based on standard landlord-tenant law,

190. Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing, supra note 69, at 81. There is a
significant body of law addressing the civil rights circumstances under which treatment can be
administered without consent to people found to be a danger to themselves or others, people who
lack capacity to make treatment decisions, and even people simply deemed by service providers
as individuals in need of aggressive treatment. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and Mental
Health Treatment, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 1145 (1997). These issues overlap with discussions
about the voluntary nature of supportive services in housing. A full treatment of how the two
topics interact is beyond the scope of this paper. For a collection of articles discussing such
matters, see COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Deborah L. Dennis and John Monahan eds., 1996).
191. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(1) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2006); see also Olmstead. V.
L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) (unjustified isolation is discrimination because “persons with
mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life
they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice”).
192. See supra note 154.
193. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-11-020 (Dec. 3, 1997) (no summary eviction in tax credit
housing); see also 24 C.F.R. § 92.253(c) (2006) (HOME program requires leases; no termination
of tenancy without good cause or judicial process); id. at § 983.256 (lease in Project-Based
Voucher program); id. at § 983.257 (good cause eviction, Project-Based Vouchers); Rev. Rul.
2004-82, 2004-350 I.R.B. (good cause evictions in LIHTC program); ANTHONY S. FREEDMAN,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING CREDIT AGENCIES, ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO HOUSING
CREDIT COMPLIANCE: A MANUAL TO ASSIST HOUSING CREDIT PROPERTY OWNERS,
MANAGERS AND STATE AGENCIES IN UNDERSTANDING AND MEETING COMPLIANCE
RESPONSIBILITIES 2-12, 5-13 (1997) (based on the legislative history, conventional practice for
tax credit units requires an initial lease of no less than six months, with month-to-month rental
agreements thereafter).
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instead of an individual’s qualifications as a participant in a program of
supportive services. 194
• Site selection, concentration, and design. Civil rights-related program
requirements already impose some site selection and design criteria intended to
promote fair housing goals. For example, it is common knowledge that most
housing developed with state and federal funds must be sited, designed, and
constructed in a manner consistent with uniform architectural standards that
make them “usable and accessible” to people with mobility and sensory
impairments. 195 Most mainstream housing programs prohibit the use of funds
for medical and institutional facilities. 196 Criteria used by HUD in the
competitive selection process for awarding Section 811 funds for the
development of housing and supportive services for people with disabilities
impose project size limits for independent living projects and group homes that
are intended to avoid high concentrations of people with disabilities in one
project, or on one site. 197 Rating factor points are awarded for project design
and siting features that are shown to “meet the individual needs of the residents
and will facilitate their integration into the surrounding community and
promote their ability to live as independently as possible.” 198
In the context of race discrimination, it is recognized that design, choice of
location, and the density and configuration of housing result in significant fair
housing consequences. So, for example, high-rise elevator buildings for
families with children are usually not eligible for HUD funding because of
concerns about density. 199 HUD civil rights-related program requirements
generally forbid site selection in areas with high concentrations of poverty and
racial segregation, and require PHAs to adopt admissions practices that serve
to deconcentrate poverty. 200 Assisted housing must also “promote greater

194. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 8; Allen, supra note 153, at 730.
195. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(5), §8.20, et seq. (2006) (Section 504 site selection and accessibility
requirements); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, et seq. (2006) (ADA Title II requirements); 28 C.F.R. §
36.211 (2006) (ADA Title III); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2006) (Title VIII accessibility
requirements for new construction).
196. 24 C.F.R. § 92.2 (HOME definition of “housing” excludes nursing facilities); 24 C.F.R.
§ 983.53(a) (forbidding use of Project-Based Housing Choice Vouchers in medical or mental
institutions, nursing homes, and facilities providing continuous psychiatric, medical, or nursing
services); 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(b) (residential rental unit that is “part of a hospital, nursing home,
sanitarium, lifecare facility, trailer park, or intermediate care facility for the mentally and
physically handicapped is not for use by the general public and is not eligible for credit under
section 42”).
197. 72 Fed. Reg. 11683, 11725 (Mar. 13, 2007).
198. 72 Fed. Reg. 11729.
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(a) (2006) (public housing); § 1437f(c)(1) (2006) (Section 8).
200. See 24 C.F.R. § 983.57 (2006) (standards for deconcentration of poverty and site and
neighborhood standards in Project-Based Housing Choice Voucher program); 24 C.F.R. § 903.2
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choice of housing opportunities,” and be accessible to amenities like
“educational, commercial, and health facilities,” public transportation and
employment opportunities. 201
Site and neighborhood standards that focus on poverty and race also apply
to the HUD housing programs that provide sources of funds for supportive
housing. 202 “Housing environmental factors, including extent of crimes and
illicit drug activities in the building and at the neighborhood level” often
influence the decision of homeless people with disabilities to stay in or leave
supportive housing because of the effect such conditions have on “their chance
of staying sober. . . and their capacity for managing stress, and consequently,
their opportunity for staying in permanent housing.” 203
Supportive housing can benefit from lessons learned in the race context
with more robust standards aimed at reducing isolation, preventing
segregation, and avoiding differential treatment. Units scattered within a
larger housing development, integrated by income and occupied by people
with and without disabilities are preferred over facilities serving only people
with disabilities. 204 High density housing with a large number of units in one
facility serving only one category of disability must be avoided, except in the
rare case where aggregating services and housing in this manner is necessary
to achieve integration for people with very significant disabilities. 205 Housing
should be built on sites that are part of vibrant communities, located near
educational, commercial, and health facilities, public transportation and
employment opportunities, away from crime, poverty, drugs, and racial
segregation. Units should be designed as apartments and homes, not as beds in
a congregate facility. Indeed, the highest and best integrative model for
supportive housing may be the one that people without disabilities expect will
apply to their own life situations: “scattered-site housing models with mobile
supports which may, or may not, be provided in the person’s home.” 206
• Race and ethnicity. Discrimination and segregation based on race and
ethnicity have long plagued public and assisted housing programs, some of it
caused by histories of deliberate segregation and deprivation of housing
opportunity for people of color, and some of it the result of benign but

(2006) (deconcentration of poverty in public housing); 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2006) (site and
neighborhood standards for public housing).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 92.202 (2006) (HOME program); 24 C.F.R. § 891.125 (2006)
(Section 811 and Section 202); 24 C.F.R. § 983.53 (2006) (Project-Based Housing Choice
Vouchers).
203. HUD, STAYING IN OR LEAVING, supra note 165, at 75.
204. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(4).
205. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 10-11.
206. Id. at 8.
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persistent neglect of racial considerations. 207
Questions of racial
discrimination are largely absent from discussions of supportive housing
programs.
Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that race, ethnic
background, and culture all play a role in preventing people of color and
people whose first language is not English from gaining access to health care
and services. There is a higher prevalence of poverty and disability among
households of color than among white households. 208 There is also a
substantially higher rate of poverty among disabled families of color compared
to white disabled households. 209 Government studies document “the existence
of striking disparities for minorities in mental health services. . . [r]acial and
ethnic minorities have less access to mental health services than do whites. . .
[t]hey are less likely to receive needed care. . . [w]hen they receive care, it is
more likely to be poor in quality.” 210 At least one study observed that
characteristics “such as race or ethnicity, may influence the propensity to use”
Medicaid HCBS waiver services. 211 As a result, some states serving high
numbers of people of color with disabilities elect against community-based
services and instead continue to limit choice to institutional forms of long term
care. 212
Of course, it is Olmstead, the ADA, and Section 504 that provide the civil
rights impetus for the new paradigm that is supportive housing. These are civil
rights authorities that guard against disability discrimination, not
discrimination based on race or ethnicity. However, the Olmstead court’s
conclusion that institutional isolation is a form of disability discrimination is
directly connected to antecedent cases in which it was understood that
stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination “is one of the most

207. For discussions of the deliberate construction of the modern American racial ghetto in
connection with federal housing programs, see, e.g., Arnold R. Hirsch, Searching for a “Sound
Negro Policy”: A Racial Agenda for the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, 11 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 393 (2000); DOUGLAS R. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Even without evidence of
deliberate discrimination, racial segregation remains a persistent feature of more contemporary
programs like the Low-Income Tax Credit program. See Korman, Underwriting for Fair
Housing, supra note 171, at 303.
208. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 17, at 13-14.
209. Id.
210. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE, RACE AND
ETHNICITY – A SUPPLEMENT TO MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3
(2001).
211. See Nancy A. Miller, Sarah Ramsland, Elizabeth Goldstein & Charlene Harrington, Use
of Medicaid 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Care Waivers to Reconfigure State Long-Term
Care Systems, 58 MED. CARE RESEARCH AND REVIEW 100, 104, 110-111 (2001).
212. Id. (“There was a negative relationship between the proportion of the population that was
African American in a state and 1915(c) waiver expenditures.”).
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serious consequences of discriminatory government action.” 213
The
obligations to further fair housing, to affirmatively market to racial and ethnic
minorities, and to refrain from racial discrimination embedded in the Fair
Housing Act and related laws apply with full force to supportive housing. It is
incumbent on supportive housing providers to attend to these issues.
VII. TOWARD A NEWER PARADIGM
The impediment to developing supportive housing represented by the
conflict between service programs dedicated to categories of people with
disabilities and housing programs forbidding such standards is a false
contradiction. For affordable housing and supportive services programs alike,
the “‘new paradigm’ of disability” is focused on “eliminating the attitudinal
and institutional barriers that preclude persons with disabilities from
participating fully in society’s mainstream.” 214 The issues of scarcity, poverty,
and disability that make it necessary for people with disabilities to command
the availability of housing and service resources are not about to vanish, and
will require setting aside housing specifically for people with disabilities for
the foreseeable future. Those issues and the imperatives of Olmstead are likely
to force the continued practice of dedicating resources to people with specific
disabilities. If supportive housing is located within a larger fabric of
opportunity for people with disabilities in the same housing that is available to
the general public, if the features of supportive housing resemble the
apartments, homes, and rights of tenancy also available to the general public,
and if access to and utilization of services is a function of individual needs,
desires, and choice, then it should not matter whether eligibility for housing is
identified by category of disability.
Systems of supportive services are in fact moving toward models that do
not restrict eligibility based on category of disability, connection to
institutions, or control of services by providers. Recent amendments to the
Medicaid statute allow states to provide home and community-based services
to elders and people with disabilities without need for a federal waiver, and
without the necessity of proving that the provision of HCBS would be less
costly than institutional care. Under the new law, people with disabilities
would qualify for services based on an individualized assessment of need;
services would be based on an individualized care plan, and states would have
the option to provide “self-directed services” where the “services for the
individual. . .are planned and purchased under the direction and control” of the
participant. 215 The same legislation creates a Medicaid demonstration program
213. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755
(1984)).
214. Silverstein, supra note 19, at 1695.
215. P.L. 109-171, Title VI §6086 (Feb. 8, 2000), amending 42 U.S.C. §1396(n).
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in which individuals who would otherwise face institutionalization receive
Medicaid-funded services “in the appropriate settings of their choice, including
costs to transition from institutional settings to a qualified residence,” such as a
home or apartment, or a “community-based residential setting, in which no
more than four unrelated persons reside.” 216
Affordable housing programs may also be moving toward more flexible
standards that permit different models of supportive housing. The recent
amendments to HUD’s Project-Based Housing Choice Voucher regulations
reflect this trend. Services may be provided at the site of the housing, or offsite, independent of the dwelling units. The new rules match people to services
based on individual need by permitting supportive housing providers to offer
selection preferences “to disabled families who need services offered at a
particular project.” 217 The rules work to preserve autonomy by mandating that
“[d]isabled residents shall not be required to accept the particular services
offered at the project.” 218 They honor the concept of separate housing only
when needed to achieve civil rights goals by limiting segregated settings to
those circumstances where there is no other means to meet the housing needs
of people with significant disabilities. 219 Perhaps the most important feature of
the Project-Based Voucher program from a civil rights standpoint is the central
role of individual choice and housing opportunity embedded in the program.
After one year of occupancy in a project-based development, participants can
request and receive a portable, tenant-based voucher in exchange for the
project-based assistance. Once issued, the tenant-based voucher enables a
participant to leave the supportive housing environment and rent a unit of their
choosing in the private market. 220
Even with these new standards of flexibility, the gap between housing
programs and service programs is not yet completely closed. The ProjectBased Voucher rule retains the prohibition on selection preferences for people
with a category of disability. 221 The recent changes to the Medicaid statute
still permit supportive service providers to limit access to community-based
services to target populations based on type of disability. 222 Under these

216. Id. at §6071. The program is implemented as the Money Follows the Person
Rebalancing Demonstration. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, FUNDING OPPORTUNITY TITLE: MONEY FOLLOWS THE
PERSON REBALANCING DEMONSTRATION (Jul. 26, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NewFreedomInitiative/downloads/MFP_2007_Announcement.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
217. 24 C.F.R. § 983.251(d) (2006).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 24 C.F.R. § 983.260 (2006).
221. 24 C.F.R. § 983.251(d) (2006).
222. P.L. 109-171, § 6086 and § 6087, supra note 66, enacting 42 U.S.C. §1396n(i)(1)(C)(ii)
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circumstances, housing opportunities for people with disabilities, especially the
people with significant disabilities that stand to benefit from Olmstead, will
depend on the ability of people with disabilities to demand, and the
concomitant ability of service and housing providers to respond by developing
supportive housing with operational hallmarks that further civil rights in order
to achieve true integration.
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